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ISSUE ALERT

Related issues have been raised in the following five
cases, all of which were heard on the April 1988 calendar:
G140

021024

Was county which came onto plaintiff's land to
prepare natural river for spring run-off exempt
from liability to plaintiff under sec.63-30-3,
management of flood waters, or was immunity from
suit waived under 63-30-10, as destruction of
plaintiff's property was not ordered at policy
level. Hansen v. Salt Lake County.

G140

021053

Was it error to declare county immune under
sec. 63-30-3, dealing with management of
floodwaters, as absolute immunity raises serious
constitutional questions and contravenes public
policy. (retroactivity should be raised by this
court sua sponte). Irvine v. Salt Lake County.

G140.03

870290

Is defendant school board immune under Section
63-30-3 where surface run-off waters coming from
the school parking regularly flood plaintiff's
yard and house, and where the flooding is due to
the negligent construction of the parking lot,
and the failure of defendant to provide a
channel for rain waters to flow in a northward
direction into a gutter running in front of
plaintiff's home, or is the effect of Section
63-3-9 that immunity under Section 63-30-3 is
waived under such circumstances? Williams v.
Carbon County Board of Education.

G140.03

20935

Where defendant school district negligently
pumped flood waters into empty field so that
waters flowed into plaintiff's property which
was at a lower elevation than school property,
and where school could have pumped waters
through temporary pipes and into a storm drain,
(1) did the removal of the waters from the
school constitute a governmental function,
relieving defendant of liability; (2) if so, is
immunity waived under Section 63-30-9 or 10, and
(3) if governmental immunity applies, does the
application of Section 63-30-3 constitute an
unconstitutional taking of plaintiff's property
under Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7
(due process)? Branam v. Provo School District

G140.03

860289

Where Clearfield City permitted contractor to
elevate property surrounding plaintiff's home,
and to change the grade or slope of the
property, and where the City also allowed the
construction of a storm system which channels
all water draining from contractor's subdivision
to a point in front of and uphill from
plaintiff's home, is defendant City liable for
resulting damage to plaintiff's property
occurring since 1981 (1) on a theory of
estoppel, since the City paid for resulting
damage through October 1984, (2) on the theory
that Section 63-30-9, waiver, should apply
rather than Section 63-30-3, (3) on the ground
that the district court cannot apply Section
63-30-3 retractively to bar plaintiff's claim,
or (4) Is the City required to compensate
plaintiff by condemnation under Article I,
Section 22 Utah Constitution? Hamblin v. City
of Clearfield

Related issues have also been raised in the following 2
cases, one of which, Greenwood v. Pleasant View City, has been
tentatively scheduled for oral argument in September of 1988, and
the other, Colman v. Land Board has been tentatively set for
November, 1988.
G140.03

860331

Does the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
specifically, Section 63-30-3, nullify
plaintiff's right to compensation under Article
I, Section 22, Utah Constitution, where the
State caused the Great Salt Lake Causeway to be
breached, causing a total destruction of
plaintiff's underwater brine canal and the
easement therefor granted to plaintiff by the
State? Colman v. Land Board

G140.03

860331

Does Southern Pacific Transportation Company
share in the State's immunity for damage caused
by breach of the causeway across the Great Salt
Lake, or did the State of Utah indemnify that
company when it adopted H.B.30, the Great Salt
Lake Causeway Act (1984 Budget Session?) Colman
v. Land Board

G140.03

870391

Does sec.63-30-3 (immunity for injury or damage
resulting from activities in flood water
management, etc.) bar personal injury plaintiff
who fell on storm drain grill (manhole cover,
Ingram v. SLC)? Greenwood v. Pleasant View
City (interlocutory appeal).

G140.03

870391

Was trial court's ruling that immunity for
"construction, repair and operation of flood and
storm systems" applied only to management of
flood waters, contrary to Utah law? Greenwood
v. Pleasant View City (interlocutory appeal).
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On November 18, 1987, this Court granted appellant's
Petition for Permission to Appeal an interlocutory order of the
Second Judicial District Court denying appellant's Motion to
Dismiss.

See copy of Supreme Court's grant of interlocutory

appeal attached hereto as Appendix I.

The lower court's denial

of the Motion to Dismiss was based upon its interpretation and
application of the second paragraph of Section 63-30-3 of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated.

This

Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant
to Section 78-2-2(3)(i) of the Utah Code, and Rule 5 of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
The issue on appeal in this case is as follows:

Did the

District Court err when it interpreted a governmental immunity
statute contrary to its plain and obvious meaning by rewriting
the clear language of the statute, and then giving as the exclusive reason for doing so the District Court's view that the
Legislature could not have intended the result which would
follow if the unambiguous language of the statute were applied
as written.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
63-30-3.

Immunity of Governmental Entities from Suit.

Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of
a governmental function . . . .
The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation
of flood and storm systems by governmental entities
are considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and employees
are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting
from those activities.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an action in negligence for personal injury

allegedly suffered by plaintiff-respondent when she stepped on
a storm drain cover and fell into a storm drain owned and
maintained by defendant-appellant Pleasant View City.
Defendant-appellant moved to dismiss plaintiff-respondent's
Complaint on the ground that the Complaint, on its face, is
barred by provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
particularly Section 63-30-3. The District Court denied the
motion and defendant-appellant petitioned this Court for
permission to appeal the interlocutory order denying the motion
to dismiss.
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This Court granted permission to appeal and the appeal was
taken.
B.

Facts of the Case
1.

The allegations contained in plaintiff-respondent's

Complaint are not disputed here.

Allegations which are

material to the law of this case are as follows:
(a) Defendant-respondent Pleasant View City is a
political subdivision and governmental entity, as those terms
are defined in Section 63-30-2(3) and (7) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
(1953, as amended).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(3) and (7)
See also plaintiff-respondent's Complaint

at 1f 2, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix II.
(b) Plaintiff-respondent received injury on or about
May 4, 1985, when she "stepped on a storm drain [grill]
maintained by Defendant
the storm drain."

. . . resulting in her falling into

Plaintiff-respondent's Complaint, supra, at

ir 3.
(c) Defendant-appellant was responsible for
maintenance of the storm drain and storm drain cover in
question.

Ld. at 11 4,
(d) Other than the allegedly negligently maintained

storm drain and storm drain cover, plaintiff-respondent alleges
no other proximate cause for her injury.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
provides absolute immunity from suit for injury or damage
resulting from "the management of flood waters and other
natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation
of flood and storm systems."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3.

The

absoluteness of immunity is clear from the language of the
statute:

"and governmental entities

. . . are immune from

suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities."
Id.
The lower court failed to apply this immunity to the
"repair and operation" of defendant-appellant's "storm system,"
ruling that the immunity applies only where the governmental
entity is managing flood waters.

This is directly contrary to

the language of the statute and, in effect, deletes by judicial
fiat a significant portion of the statutory language purposefully used by the Legislature.

Such is contrary to Utah law.

The lower court's ruling, based upon the lower court's view
that a straightforward interpretation and application of the
literal, ordinary, plain and unambiguous terms of the statute
would bring about a result contrary to the intention of the
Legislature, is also contrary to Utah law.

The Utah Supreme

Court has stated that where application of the ordinary meaning
of a statute brings about a result contrary to legislative
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intent, the remedy is to be found in the legislature, not the
courts.
The lower court's denial of defendant-appellant's Motion to
Dismiss was contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of
applicable statute and contrary to Utah law regarding statutory
construction and application.

The lower court's action must be

reversed and judgment entered in favor of defendant-appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 63-30-3 OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT GRANTS ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY TO
APPELLANT
During the 1984 Budget Session, the Utah Legislature passed
a "Flood Relief" bill, Senate Bill No. 97, which contained an
amendment to Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act (the "Act").

The amended section, with the amended portion

underlined, reads as follows:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this [act]
chapter all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise of a
governmental function, governmentally owned hospital,
nursing home, or other governmental health care
facility, and from an improved medical, nursing, or
other professional health care clinical training program conducted in either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and the construction, repair and operation of flood and storm systems
by governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their
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officers and employees are immune from suit for any
injury or damage resulting from those activities.
See 1984 Utah Laws, ch. 33, § 3, copy attached hereto as
Appendix III.
This amendment clearly defines governmental flood control
activities and the construction, repair and operation of a
storm water collection system as "governmental functions."

The

Legislature, however, clarified the extent of immunity to be
granted these activities by including the phrase:

"and govern-

mental entities and their officers and employees are immune
from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those
activities."

Id.

By this clarifying language, the Legislature

intended and accomplished a clear distinction between the
qualified immunity found in the first paragraph of Section
63-30-3 ("except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter")
and the second paragraph's absolute immunity applying to flood
control activities and storm system construction, repair and
operation.
If the Legislature had intended otherwise, it would have
completed the amended second paragraph by simply defining these
activities as "governmental functions," thereby reverting back
to the qualifying language contained in the first paragraph of
the Section.

The Legislature, however, did not do so. By

adding the clear language that governmental entities and their
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officers and employees "are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from" the management of flood waters and the
construction, repair and operation of a flood or storm system,
the Legislature made it very clear that such activities are to
be given absolute immunity.
This Court has succinctly stated that the courts of this
State must "assume[] that the terms of a statute are used
advisedly and should be given an interpretation and application
which is in accord with their usually accepted meanings."
Board of Ed. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659
P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983).

See also Grant v. Utah State Land

Bd., 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036-37 (1971)
("Foundational rules require that we assume that each term of
the statute was used advisedly.").

Because the Legislature

added language to the statute ("and governmental entities . . .
are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from
those activities") that was unnecessary but for an intended
clarification that the listed activities be given unqualified
immunity from suit, this Court must interpret and apply that
additional language consistent with both the Legislature's
advised use thereof and the obvious legislative intent manifest
therein.

Doing so results in only one possible interpretation

and application:

absolute immunity attaches to the governmental
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activities of managing flood waters and constructing, repairing
and operating flood and storm systems.1

1

Numerous cases involving this same issue of law have been
adjudicated before several District Courts of the State of
Utah. Except for the instant case here on appeal, all have
held that the 1984 amendment to Section 63-30-3 of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act clarifies that a governmental entity's
management of flood waters and its construction, repair and
operation of flood and storm systems are absolutely immune from
suit. Those cases include: Anderson v. City of Nephi, Civil
No. 5982 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah, April 23, 1987)
(The Hon. George E. Ballif, Judge); Hochhalter v. Sandy City
Corp., Civil No. C85-524 (Third Judicial District Court, Utah,
March 2, 1987) (The Hon. David S. Young, Judge); White's, Inc.
v. Cache County, Case No. 25080 (Second Judicial District Court
- sitting by request of First Judicial District Court, Utah,
Nov. 6, 1986) (The Hon. Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge); Warren^Irrigation Co. v. Weber County, Case No. 92165 (Second Judicial
District Court, Utah, October 2, 1986) (The Hon. David E. Roth,
Judge); Rydman v. Sandy City Corp., Civil No. C85-0107 (Third
Judicial District Court, Utah, March 11, 1986) (The Hon.
Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge); Larsen v. Brigham City, Civil No.
18979 (First Judicial District Court, Utah, Jan. 31, 1986) (The
Hon. Omer J. Call, Judge); Branam v. Provo Sch. Dist., Civil
No. 66,442 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah, Sept. 9,
1985) (The Hon. George E. Ballif, Judge) (currently on appeal);
Blackburn v. Bountiful City, Civil No. 36265 (Second Judicial
District Court, Utah, March 14, 1985) (The Hon. Douglas L.
Cornaby, Judge); Mendenhall v. Orem City Corp., Civil No. 62597
62597 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah, Oct. 9, 1984) (The
Hon. George E. Ballif, Judge); Fairchild v. Millard County,
Civil No. 7733 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah, Oct. 2,
1984) (The Hon. J. Robert Bullock, Judge); Palmer v. Millard
County, Civil No. 7732 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah,
August 22, 1984) (The Hon. David Sam, Judge); Chelsey v. Delta
City, Civil No. 7846 (Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah,
July 9, 1984) (The Hon. Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge);
Brakenseik v. Dixie Six Corp., Salt Lake County and Sandy City,
Civil No. C-84-0564 (Third Judicial District Court, Utah, May
18, 1984) (The Hon. Scott Daniels, Judge). Copies of Rulings,
Orders and Judgements from these cases are attached hereto as
Appendix IV.
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POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF SECTION 63-30-3 WAS CONTRARY
TO UTAH LAW
In denying appellant's Motion to Dismiss, the District Court
below made two critical errors:

(i) it refused to distinguish

the governmental activities of constructing, repairing and
operating flood and storm systems from management of flood
waters, holding instead that Section 63-30-3 of the Act only
provides immunity to a governmental entity in "constructing,
repairing, operating a storm system, while managing flood
waters," see Order (emphasis added), copy attached hereto as
Appendix V; and (ii) it refused to apply the plain and unambiguous terms of Section 63-30-3 to the facts of this case
because, according to the lower court, to do so would bring
about a result contrary to the intention of the Legislature.
See Judge's Ruling at p.2, copy attached hereto as Appendix VI
("[T]his isn't the typical kind of a case I think the
Legislature had in mind when they enacted this statute.").
Each of these errors will be addressed separately.
A.

Immunity Applies to the Construction, Repair and
Operation of Flood and Storm Systems When Flood Waters
are not Present

Courts must assume that terms in a statute are used
advisedly by the Legislature, and, accordingly, courts must
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apply those terms in accordance with their accepted meanings.
See Board of Ed. of Granite Sch. Dist., 659 P.2d at 1035.

By

ruling that immunity applies only when a governmental entity is
"managing flood waters," the lower court held, in effect, that
the terms "construction, repair, and operation of flood and
storm systems" have no meaning or application different than or
distinguishable from the terms "management of flood waters."
By so holding, the lower court legislated away specific,
express terms of the statute which, according to the law in
Utah, were used advisedly by the Legislature.
In clear and unambiguous language the statute divides
immune governmental activities into two specific and distinct
categories:

(i) management of flood waters and other natural

disasters; and (ii) construction, repair and operation of flood
and storm systems.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 ("and other

natural disasters" was added by amendment in 1985, see 1985
Utah Laws, ch. 93 § 1, copy attached hereto as Appendix VII).
The lower court's deletion by judicial fiat of the second
category for immunity—the construction, repair and operation
of flood and storm systems—is blatantly contrary to Utah law.
When a statute's meaning is plain from the words and
language chosen by the Legislature, the court's function is to
give effect to the law as written.

In Gord v. Salt Lake City,

20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 (1967), this Court declared:

-10-

The enactment of the statute prescribing this
procedure is the legislative prerogative. It carries
with it the presumptions that it is valid, and that
the words and phrases were chosen advisedly to express
the legislative intent. The statute should not be
stricken down nor applied other than in accordance
with its literal wording unless it is so unclear or
confused as to be wholly beyond reason, or inoperable,
or it contravenes some basic constitutional right. If
it meets these tests it is not the court's prerogative
to consider its wisdom, or its effectiveness, nor even
the reasonableness or orderliness of the procedures
set forth, but it has a duty to let it operate as the
legislature has provided.
434 P.2d at 451. The statutory distinction of two separate
categories for immunity is not unclear, confused or inoperable,
nor is it wholly beyond reason; and there is no claim that it
is unconstitutional.

The lower court, then, was duty bound to

apply the statute and grant immunity to both categories of
governmental activity.

Id.

See also West Jordan v. Morrison,

656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982).

Its refusal to grant immunity

for the construction, repair and operation of flood and storm
systems, then, was contrary to Utah law.
B.

The Lower Court's Justification for its Refusal to
Apply the Plain Meaning of the Statute is Contrary to
Utah Law

The lower court held that a straightforward interpretation
and application of the ordinary, plain and unambiguous terms of
the statute in question would bring about a result contrary to
the intention of the Legislature.

See Judge's Ruling, supra.

This Court, however, has stated that where application of the
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"ordinary meaning" of a statute "brings about a result contrary
to the intention of the Legislature, it is a matter for the
Legislature to remedy.

This court may not do so."

West Jordan

v. Morrison, 656 P.2d at 447.
Respondent's Complaint, on its face, alleged that her
injury was proximately caused by appellant's negligence in
failing to keep in good repair part of its storm system.

The

allegation, on its face, falls four-square within the immunity
provision of Section 63-30-3 which protects "repair" activities
—and thus the failure to repair—on appellant's storm system.
The lower court does not have the prerogative to consider
whether the "Legislature had in mind" the manner in which
plaintiff-respondent received this particular kind of injury
"when they enacted the statute."

Compare Judge's Ruling,

supra, with West Jordan, 656 P.2d at 446.

But, even if the

lower court considered what the Legislature had in mind, it
could only have concluded that the language of the statute was
consistent with the intent of the Legislature.

When the

legislature added "and other natural disasters" to the second
paragraph of Section 63-30-3 in 1985, the title of the act
which included that amendment stated in pertinent part:
"INCLUDING MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL DISASTERS AS AN ACTIVITY FOR
WHICH GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES ARE IMMUNE."
Ch. 93, supra.

1985 Utah Laws,

The intent that all of the activities included
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in the second paragraph of Section 63-30-3 be immune from suit
is clear from this language in the title of the act.

See Great

Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414
P.2d 963, 965 (1956) (where a title of an enactment can shed
light and clarify the meaning and purpose of the enactment,
reference to the title is appropriate).

Thus, it is clear that

the plain and unambiguous language of the immunity provision is
consistent with legislative intent.
In any event, the lower court must apply the terms of the
statute as written unless such are unreasonably confused,
inoperable, blatantly contradictory to the express purpose of
the statute, unconstitutional, or wholly beyond reason.
Jordan, 656 P.2d at 446; Gord, 434 P.2d at 451.

West

If the statute

meets that test, as Section 63-30-3 does here, the court is
duty bound to apply it—even if the Court believes application
of the

statute is unwise or outside the contemplation of

legislators at the time of passage.

Any other law regarding

statutory construction would allow individual judges to
legislate by judicial fiat, contrary to the separation of
powers clause of the Utah Constitution.

Utah Const. Art. V,

sec. 1.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court's
denial of appellant's Motion to Dismiss should be, and it is
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hereby respectfully requested that the same be, reversed and
remanded to the District Court for entry of dismissal with
prejudice of respondent's Complaint.
DATED this ^fi^ day of February, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Allan L. ^arsc
Christopher C. Fuller
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
SCMCCF140
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APPENDIX I

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
November 18, 1987
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Allan L. Larson, Esq.
Christopher C. Fuller
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Fllor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

Carol Greenwood,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

No. 870391

Pleasant View City, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

THIS DAY, Petition for an interlocutory appeal having been
heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised
in the premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory appeal be,
and the same is, granted.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

APPENDIX

II

S T A N L E Y L. BALLIF (0192)
A t t o r n e y for Plaintiff
U n i t e d S a v i n g s Plaza
4 1 8 5 H a r r i s o n Boulevard
S u i t e 300
O g d e n , Utah
84403
Telephone:
(801) 394-5579
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF AND FOR
WEBER C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH
CAROL

GREENWOOD.
S U M M O N S

Plaintiff,
vs.
i

P L E A S A N T VIEW CITY, a
Municipal Corporation,

Civil

No.

Defendant.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED
You

DEFENDANT(S)

are hereby summoned and required to file an answer

in w r i t i n g to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the a b o v e entitled

Court,

Plaintiff's
Ogden,

and to serve upon, or mail to STANLEY L. BALLIF,

attorney,

Utah 8 4 4 0 3 ,

at

4185 Harrison B o u l e v a r d ,

a copy of said a n s w e r ,

Suite

300,

within 20 days

after

s e r v i c e of this summons upon y o u .
If you fail so to d o , judgment by default will be taken
a g a i n s t you for the relief demanded
been

filed

in said C o m p l a i n t ,

which

has

with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which

is

h e r e t o annexed and herewith served upon y o u .
DATED this

day of

, 1985.

SIANLkV L. BALLIF
Attorney for

Plaintiff

STANLEY L. BALLIF (0192)
Attorney.for Plaintiff
U n i t e d Savings Plaza
4185 H a r r i s o n Boulevard
Suite 300
O g d e n , Utah
84403
Telephone:
(801) 394-5579
IN THE S E C O N D JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T COURT OF AND FOR
WEBER C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH

]

CAROL GREENWOOD,

C O M P L A I N T

Plaintiff,
vs.
!

P L E A S A N T VIEW CITY, a
Municipal Corporation,

Civil

No.

C

/.>i/">

Defendant.

COMES NOW,

STANLEY L.

B A L L I F , Attorney for P l a i n t i f f ,

and f o r cause of action against D e f e n d a n t ,

complains and alleges

as f o l l o w s :
1.

That

Plaintiff

is a resident of

Weber

County,

S t a t e of U t a h .
2.

That D e f e n d a n t ,

Corporation-organized
3.
a

Pleasant View City, is a Municipal

under the laws of the State of Utah.

That on or about May 4, 1 9 8 5 , Plaintiff stepped on

storm drain m a i n t a i n e d by Defendant next to her residence

the grill was not set p r o p e r l y , resulting
storm

in her falling into the

drain.
4.

storm

and

drain

condition.

That
and

Defendant was n e g l i g e n t

storm

drain cover in a

in maintaining

reasonable

and

the
safe

5.

That D e f e n d a n t was given n o t i c e of claim pursuant

to Utah Code A n n o t a t e d §63-3-11 and has denied the same.
6.

That

as a p r o x i m a t e result of the negligence

Defendant,

the

Plaintiff

debilitating

injuries,

suffered

serious,

permanent

of
and

all to her general d a m a g e in an amount to

be e s t a b l i s h e d upon p r o o f ,
7.

That by reason of the n e g l i g e n c e of the D e f e n d a n t ,

the

P l a i n t i f f has incurred hospital and m e d i c a l expenses and

the

f u t u r e will

amount

incur hospital and medical e x p e n s e s ,

the

in

exact

of which are unknown at this time but for which which

she

shall be e n t i t l e d to recover upon p r o o f .
8.
the

That by reason of the n e g l i g e n c e of the D e f e n d a n t ,

Plaintiff

earnings,

has

lost earnings and in the

future

will

lose

the exact amount of which is u n k n o w n at this time

but

for w h i c h she shall be entitled to recover upon p r o o f .
9.
the

That by reason of the n e g l i g e n c e of the D e f e n d a n t ,

Plaintiff

sustained

damage to her e a r n i n g capacity

in

an

a m o u n t to be e s t a b l i s h e d upon p r o o f .
10.
§78-27-44,

the

P u r s u a n t to the p r o v i s i o n s of Utah Code A n n o t a t e d
P l a i n t i f f is entitled to i n t e r e s t on all special

d a m a g e s at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of the a c c i d e n t
to t h e date of j u d g m e n t .
WHEREFORE,

Plaintiff

prays

judgment

against

the

established

upon

D e f e n d a n t as f o l l o w s :
1.

For

general damages as may be

proof.
COMPLAINT
G R E E N W O O D v s . P L E A S A N T VIEW
Civi1 No.
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2.

For

special

d a m a g e s as may be e s t a b l i s h e d

upon

3.

For interest on special d a m a g e s at the rate of 8%

per annum from the date of the a c c i d e n t to the date of j u d g m e n t ,
4.

For

costs of this action and and for such

and f u r t h e r relief as the C o u r t deems just and
DATED this

proper.

day of

, 1985,

STANLEY L. BALLIF
A t t o r n e y for

COMPLAINT
G R E E N W O O D v s . P L E A S A N T VIEW
Civil N o .
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Plaintiff

other

APPENDIX III

FLOOD RELIEF

CH. 33

CHAPTER 33
S. B. No. 97

(Passed January 28. 1984. In effect March 29. 1984.)
(Failed to obtain 2/3 vote required for earlier effect.)
FLOOD RELIEF - 1984

By Senator Finlmson
AN ACT RELATING TO FLOODING; CLARIFYING FLOODING AS A
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION FOR PURPOSES OF GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY; PROVIDES AS CRITERIA FOR THE DRB FUNDING
MULTI-COUNTY FLOOD DAMAGE; GIVING EMERGENCY FLOOD
POWERS TO THE STATE ENGINEER; CREATING A TASK FORCE TO
LOOK AT INTER-COUNTY FLOODING; STATING THAT IT IS IN
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE STATE AND ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS TO MANAGE THE STATE'S BODIES OF WATER; APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR FLOODING; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 63-30-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 116, LAWS OF UTAH 1981, AND
SECTION 63-52a-10, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. AS ENACTED
BY CHAPTER 15, LAWS OF UTAH 1983, FIRST SPECIAL SESSION;
ENACTS SECTIONS 63-52a-1.5 AND 73-2-22. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. AND ENACTS NEW MATERIAL.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1.

Section amended.

Section 63-30-3. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by
Chapter 116. Laws of Utah 1981, is amended to read:
6 3 - 3 0 - 3 . Immunity of governmental entities from suit
Except as may be otherwise provided in this [aet] chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function, govemmentally-owned hospital,
nursing home, or other governmental health care facility, and from an
approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in either public or private facilities.
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The management of flood waters and the construction, repair, and
operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their
officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage
resulting from those activities.
Section 2.

Section amended.

Section 63-52a-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953. as enacted by Chapter
15, Laws of Utah 1983, First Special Session, is amended to read:
63 -52a -10. Conditions for granting disaster relief funds--Standards
for repair, construction, and land use--Potential for multiple county
flood damage.
(1) As a condition of any disaster relief funds granted under this
chapter, the receiving political subdivision shall agree that any repair or
construction to be financed therewith shall be in accordance with applicable
standards of safety, decency, and sanitation and in conformity with applicable codes, specifications, and standards, and shall furnish such evidence
' of compliance with this section as may be required by the DRB. As a
further condition of receiving a disaster relief grant under this chapter, the
receiving political subdivision shall agree that the natural hazards in the
areas in which the proceeds of the grants are to be used will be evaluated
and appropriate action taken to mitigate those hazards, including safe land
use and construction practices, in accordance with standards prescribed or
approved by the DRB after adequate consultation with the governing body
of the political subdivision to which the grant is to be made.
(2) Whenever the DRB considers a request for disaster relief funds for
a political subdivision and there is a potential for multiple county flood
damage, the political subdivision must provide the DRB with information
on the effect any project has on downstream counties. That information
shall be considered as part of the DRB's criteria for approving the funding.
Section 3.

Section enacted.

Section 73-2-22, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read:
73-2-22. Emergency flood powers--Action to enforce orders--Access
rights to private and public property--Injunctive relief against state
engineer's decisions--Judicial review provisions not applicable.
Whenever the state engineer, with approval of the chairman of the
Disaster Emergency Advisory Council, makes a written finding that any
reservoir or stream has reached or will reach during the current water year
a level far enough above average and in excess of capacity that public safety
is or is likely to be endangered or that substantial property damage is
149
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTA^i

ANDY ANDERSON and BEVERLY
ANDERSON, as individuals and
conservators of the estate
Of CODY ANDERSON,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 5982

vs.
RULING
THE CITY OF NEPHI and LYNN'S
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendants.

This matter is before the court on defendant Nephi
City's (Nephi) Motion for Summary Judgment in its favor and
against plaintiffs Andy Anderson and Beverly Anderson, and
against co-defendant Lynn's Construction Company on Nephi's
cross-claim.

The court having carefully considered the motion

and accompanying memoranda now enters its
RULING
Nephi bases its motion to dismiss on the immunity
granted it by Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) (U.C.A.) 6330-3 which states in pertinent part
The management of flood waters and other
natural disasters and the construction,
repair, and operation of flood and storm
systems by governmental entities are
considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from those activities.
Nephi's status as a governmental entity is not
disputed.

This court has previously ruled on U.C.A. 63-30-3 and

held that it

provides absolute immunity to governmental
entities from suit for any injury or damage
resulting from management of flood waters and
the construction, repair, and operation of
flood and storm systems by governmental
entities; the Court concludes that the 1984
amendment to Utah Code Ann. 63-30-3 is
applicable to causes of action arising even
before the amendment . . .
Russell Mendenhall, et al. v. University Mall, Inc., et al., Utah
County, Civil No. 62,597 (October 24, 1984) and Evah Conk
Fairchild v. State of Utah, et al., Millard County, Civil No.
7733 (September 27, 1984).
Nephi City contracted with Lynn's Construction Company
to repair and improve the city's flood channels following damage
to their flood and storm system in 1983.

The evidence before

this Court supports the conclusion that the primary purpose of
the work so contracted was to repair and construct Nephi 1 s flood
and storm system.

A major part of this repair and improvement

project was the construction of cement headwalls around the
culverts that ran under roads.

Incidental to this work was the

widening and resurfacing of abutting roads.

This court finds

that where the major purpose and part of a municipal construction
project is to construct or repair a flood and storm system, the
activity falls within U.C.A. 63-30-3's protection to governmental
entities for the "management of flood waters . . . and the
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems
[. ],f

This finding is given additional weight in the instant case

where the facts indicate that the young Cody Anderson fell from
one of the headwalls under construction and was injured.

Based on the foregoing analysis, defendant Nephi City's
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Counsel for Nephi City

is directed to prepare an appropriate order and submit it to the
court.

DATED, at Provo, Utah, this

£ J

day of April, 1987.

JODY K BURNETT
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RUDY HOCHHALTER, RICHARD and
JUNE THOMPSON, ALTA McCLEERY,
ERWIN SCHELIN, GERALD and MERI
OSHEL, KAREN and BLAINE CRAVENS,
and RUDOLPH and SUKI SIEPEL,
Plaintiffs,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Civil No. C85-5241

vs.

Judge David S. Young

SANDY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.

The above-named defendant Sandy City Corporation's Motion
for Summary Judgment came on for oral argument before the abovereferenced Court, the Honorable David S. Young presiding, on
Tuesday, February 17, 1987, with plaintiffs represented by
William L. Schultz and defendant represented by Christopher C.
Fuller of Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, affidavit and
memoranda on file, having heard oral argument, and being fully
advised in the premises, concludes that the Utah Governmental
-1-

Immunity Act's Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, provides absolute immunity to governmental entities
from suit for any injury or damage resulting from the repair
and operation of a flood and storm system, that plaintiffs'
allegations against defendant Sandy City fall within the absolute immunity provisions of Section 63-30-3, that there are no
material facts in dispute sufficient to overcome application of
the statutory grant of absolute immunity in this case, and that,
accordingly, defendant Sandy City is immune from suit for the
injury or damage complained of by plaintiffs here, and defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment is well taken, and as a matter of law,
should be granted.
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plaintiffs' Complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice and
on the merits, and that final judgment be, and hereby is, entered
in favor of defendant and against plaintiffs, No Cause of Action,
each party to bear its own costs.
DATED this

.^

day of February, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

fel y&h >•*) £ x/n<n.t
9- :
David S. Young
Third District Judge

-2-

GARY 0. McKEAN
DEPUTY CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY
160 North Main Street, Suite 204
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 752-8920
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
WHITE'S INC., d/b/a WHITE'S
TROUT FARM,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

Cache County Civil No. 25

vs.
CACHE COUNTY, a Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for oral argument
before this Court, sitting by special designation for and on
behalf of the First Judicial District Court in and for Cache
County, on Friday, October 31, 1986, with Gary 0. McKean, Deputy
Cache County Attorney and Christopher C. Fuller of Snow, Christensen & Martineau representing defendant and George W, Preston
of Harris, Preston, Gutke & Chambers representing plaintiff.
Having heard oral arguments by both parties, having reviewed the
memoranda filed by each side, having issued a Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [sic] dated November 6, 1986,

-1-

and being fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes
that:
(a) Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that defendant Cache
County was negligent in installing beneath a county road, a culvert that was inadequate and could not accommodate drainage water
in a period of heavy water run-off, that defendant was negligent
in not correcting the inadequacy, and that, after a substantial
rainfall in February of 1986, defendant failed to timely cut the
road where the culvert was located in order to expedite drainage
of accumulating water even though plaintiff had requested that it
do so, all of which caused damage to plaintiff's property;
(b) Said allegations fall under the provisions of Section
63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which provisions
give absolute immunity to governmental entities for flood control
activities and for storm system construction, repair and operation,
regardless of any other provisions in the chapter;
(c) The provisions are clear and unambiguous, and grant absolute immunity to defendant.
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plaintiff's Complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice and
on the merits, each party to bear its own costs.
DATED this ^J3

day of November, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

r\L ,A

• l-

Ronald 0. Hyde, District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WHITE'S INC., dba
WHITE'S TROUT FARM,

]
i
1
!

Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CACHE COUNTY, a Municipal
corporation,
i

Case No.

25080

Defendant.

Plaintiff

had filed

action

against

damage to their property caused by high water.

the

defendant

for

Plaintiff alleges

that the defendant replaced a bridge with culverts which would
not accommodate drainage water in a period of heavy water runoff.
Plaintiffs claim they were negligent in installing the culvert
and in failing to correct or otherwise remedy the restriction.
Plaintiff claims that in February, 1986, Cache County sustained
substantial rainfall and the culvert in question was inadequate
to hand!? the water drairage in the area.
requested

that

Commissioners
flood waters.

they

be

allowed

to

Further, the plaintiff
cut

the

road

or

the

cut the road in order to avoid damage from the
Plaintiff claims that immunity has been waived by

reason of Section 63-30-8, 9, and 10.
immune under Section 63-30-3.

Defendant claims they are
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During
passed a

the

"flood

63-30-3, of

1984

relief

Budget
bill

Session,

carrying

the Utah Governmental

the

an

Utah

Legislature

amendment

Immunity

Act.

to

Section

The amendment

states that the management of flood waters and the construction/
repairr

and the operation of flood and storm systems by govern-

mental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune
from

suit

for

any

injury

or

damage

resulting

from

those

activities.
This paragraph
mental

entity

system

construction,

gives

in regard

to

absolute

flood

repair,

and

immunity

to

the

govern-

control activities and
operation,

regardless

storm

of

any

other provisions in the chapter.
Plaintiffs allegation is that they received injury as a
result

of

waters.

the
It

is

inadequacy
their

of

claim

the
that

culvert
this

to

is

carry

negligence,

claiming negligence, this removes it from 63-30-3.
claim

that

the

grvernmental

entities

away

should

have

flood
and

by

Further, they
managed

the

flood waters by cutting road, thereby increasing the capacity of
the

culvert

actionable.

in question,

and

that

their

failure

Section 63-30-3 grants immunity

of flood waters.

to

do

so

is

for the management
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I hold that the acts complained of in this action fall
under the provisions for the construction, repair and operation
of storm systems and for the management of flood waters.
immunity

provisions

of

Section

63-30-3

are

clear

and

The
grant

absolute immunity to the defendant.
Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint is
granted.
DATED this

O

day of November, 1986.

RONALD 0. HYDE, Judgi

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this (/^ day of November, 1986,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment was served upon the following:
George W. Preston
HARRIS, PRESTON, GUTKE h CHAMBERS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
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Gary 0. McKean
Deputy Cache County Attorney
160 North Main Street, Suite 204
Logan, Utah 84321
Christopher C. Fuller
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorney for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, 11th floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

t^s**
ULA CARR, Secretary

ALLAN L. LARSON
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WARREN IRRIGATION COMPANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER

vs.
WEBER COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah,
Defendant.

Civil No. 92165

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's
Motion to Amend Complaint came on for oral argument before this
Court on Monday, September 15, 1986, at 11:00 o'clock a.m.,
defendant being represented by Christopher C. Fuller of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau, and plaintiff being represented by
Michael J, Glassman and E. J. Skeen of Van Cott, Bagley,
Cornwall & McCarthy.

Having reviewed the memoranda and

affidavits filed by both parties on both motions, having heard
oral argument from both parties, having issued a Ruling on
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Amend dated
October 24, 1986, and being fully advised in the premises, the
Court concludes as follows:
(a)

With respect to plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint,

the third cause of action in plaintiff's proposed Second
Amended Complaint raises matters which occurred in the spring
of 1984, approximately one year after the events and acts
complained of in plaintiff's previous Complaints and in the
Notice of Claim it filed with defendant Weber County, and
involves actions and allegations that are substantially
different from those raised in these earlier documents.
Because the notice of claim provision of Section 63-30-13, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, serves as a condition precedent to the filing of
a lawsuit against a governmental entity, and because the third
cause of action in plaintiff's proposed Second Amended
Complaint raises issues and alleges actions, events and
injuries substantially different both in content and in time of
occurrence from those raised and alleged in its previous
Complaints and as set forth in its Notice of Claim, plaintiff
should have filed a timely Notice of Claim with defendant
complaining of the 1984 injuries.

-2-

Plaintiff's failure to so

file a timely Notice of Claim bars the third cause of action in
its proposed Second Amended Complaint; and, there being no
substantive difference between plaintiff's first and second
causes of action in its proposed Second Amended Complaint and
those causes of action in plaintiff's Amended Complaint,
plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint should be denied;
(b)

With respect to defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment, Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, clearly provides absolute immunity to defendant Weber
County for any injury or damage resulting from the management
of flood waters.

Here, in an attempt to manage the widespread

flooding in Weber County during May of 1983 and after declaring
a local disaster emergency, defendant, by and through its
authorized officers, breached plaintiff's canal.

Pursuant to

the Governmental Immunity Act provisions cited above, defendant
is immune from plaintiff's first cause of action for damages
allegedly resulting from the breach of plaintiff's canal.
Furthermore, plaintiff's second cause of action for inverse
condemnation is not recognized as a valid claim by Utah courts,
as evidenced by the holdings in Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117
(Utah 1975), and Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d
417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960).
(c)

Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of defendant

should be granted as to plaintiff's first and second causes of

-3-

action, and, because plaintiff's proposed third cause of action
is barred as set forth above, plaintiff's Amended Complaint
should be dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law, there
being no dispute as to any material fact.
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
(a) plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint be, and the same
hereby is, denied; (b) there being no dispute as to any
material fact, as a matter of law, defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment be, and hereby is, granted; and
(c) accordingly, plaintiff's Amended Complaint be, and hereby
is, dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, each party to
bear its own costs.
DATED this

/^

fUf

day of __

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

By

D70/1P E. ROTH

David E. Roth, Second Judicial
District Judge
SCMCCF10
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
WARREN IRRIGATION COMPANY,
a corporation,

]
1
I
i

Plaintiff,

vs.
WEBER COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the
State of Utah,

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
MOTION TO AMEND

]
)
1

Case No.

92165

Defendant.

Having heard arguments of counsel and considering the
memoranda on filef I rule as follows:
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In May of 1983, Weber County was experiencing widespread
flooding.

The Weber County Commissioners declared that a local

disaster emergency existed.

The Countyf in attempting to manage

the flood, breached plaintiff's canal.

Plaintiffs specifically

denied permission to breach their canal.

Plaintiffs claim damage

in

their

first

cause

of

action

alleging

that, there was

no

emergency caused by flood waters and that no flooding could have
been prevented by breaching the canal.
of

action

alleges

inverse

Plaintiff1s second cause

condemnation

suggesting

that

the

County, in May, 1983, took possession of plaintiff1s property.
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destroyed a segment of plaintiff's canal, and then required that
plaintiff

replace

the

segment

(with

three

large

culverts

of

greater capacity) at a cost of $38f900.
I find that Section 63-30-3 and 63-30-10(1)(a), U.C.A.,
clearly provide absolute immunity to Weber County for any injury
or damage resulting from the management of flood waters.

Defen-

dant's motion

as to

for

summary

judgment

is

therefore

of

action

granted

plaintiff's first cause of action.
Plaintiff's
condemnation.

second

cause

alleges

inverse

Causes of action for inverse condemnation have not

been recognized by Utah Courts.

Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117

(1975); Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d
105 (1960).

Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment

is granted as to plaintiff's second cause of action.
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
Plaintiff
allege
actions

a third
of

the

moves to file a Second

cause

of

action

defendant

in

claiming

the

spring

Amended
damage

of

Complaint

resulting

1984.

to

from

Plaintiff's

Notice of Claim, plaintiff's original Complaint, and plaintiff's
Amended

Complaint

allege

activities in May of 1983.

damage

resulting

from

defendant's

The second Amended Complaint

claims

damage in the amount of $33,100, due to defendant's requirement
the plaintiff insert three large culverts underneath the canal in
question.

Plaintiff claims that this requirement amounts to a

Page 3
Ruling on Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Amend
Case No. 92165

taking on the part of of the County.
other

Defendant argues, among

things, that plaintiff's claim is barred because plain-

tiff's Second Amended Complaint makes a claim that is totally
separate and distinct from the claims made in earlier documents
and that plaintiff failed to file a Notice of Claim with respect
to the spring of 1984f cause of action.
Section 63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, requires that
a claim against a political subdivision be filed within one year
after the claim arises.
"prevent needless

The purpose of this requirement is to

litigation" and

to give

"authorities prompt

notice of an injury and the surrounding circumstances in order
that the matter may be investigated while the matter is fresh,
the

witnesses

available,

and

before

conditions

have

changed

materially, and that the liability of the municipality or the
extent of the liability may be determined."
686.

56 AmJur2d Sec.

The notice requirement is not in the nature of a Statute of

Limitations and is considered a necessary condition precedent to
the filing of a lawsuit.
County, 389 P.2d
officials may

392

56 AmJur2d Sec. 683, Barney v. Clark

(Nevada, 1964).

have had actual

knowledge

The
of

fact

that County

the circumstances

which results in a claim does not dispense with the necessity of
filing a timely claim.
158 (1973) .

Varoz v. Sevev, 506 P.2d 435, 29 Utah 2d
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I find
proposed

that

Second

plaintiff1s

Amended

third

Complaint

cause

raises

of

action

issues

in the

that

arose

approximately one year after the events and acts complained of in
the previous Complaints and Notice of Claim.
and

allegations

raised

in

that

previous

are

substantially

documents.
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different

Plaintiff

timely Notice of Claim complaining

It involves actions

should

from

have

those

filed

a

of defendant's actions taken

Plaintiff's failure to do so requires

that I deny their motion to amend.
Defendant to prepare a formal ruling in this case.
DATED this J L ^ d a y of October, 1986.

ALLAN L. LARSON (A1896)
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER (A4319)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
ROY G. RYDMAN and KATHY M.
RYDMAN,
Plaintiffs,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

Civil No. C85-0107
SANDY CITY CORPORATION,
LAWRENCE P. SMITH and
RANDY TAYLOR,

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.
The above-named defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
came on for oral argument before the above-referenced Court,
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, on Monday, January 20,
1986, with plaintiffs represented by J. David Nelson of Bailey,
Nelson & Conklin, and defendants represented by Christopher C.
Fuller of Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, affidavit and
memoranda on file, having heard oral argument, and being fully
advised in the premises, concludes that (a) defendants' activities complained of by plaintiffs are immune from suit by virtue

1-

of Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the
"Act"), which grants absolute immunity for damages resulting
from the construction/ repair and operation of flood and storm
systems; (b) that any representations made to plaintiffs with
respect to such activities by defendants Smith or Taylor in their
representative capacities as Mayor and Public Works Director of
Sandy City, respectively, are immune from suit by virtue of
Section 63-30-10 (1)(f) of the Act, which excepts a waiver of
immunity for damages resulting from misrepresentations of governmental entity employees; and (c) that, based upon the foregoing,
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is well-taken and, as a
matter of law, should be granted.
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs' Complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice
and on the merits, that final judgment be, and hereby is, entered
in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs, no cause of action,
each party to bear its own costs.
DATED this

. 1986.

11 ~^day of

COURT:

*32^__
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:
BAILEY, NELSON & CONKLIN
B

Y-

J. Davxd Nelson
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s
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ALLAN L. LARSON
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Brigham City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CURTIS D. LARSEN,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 18979
BRIGHAM CITH,
Defendant.
Defendant Brigham City's Motion for Summary Judgment came
on for oral argument before the above-/£eferenced Court on October
25, 1985.

Following oral argument, the Court granted a 30-day

time period in which plaintiff could file additional memoranda
or counter-affidavits in opposition to defendant's Motion.
Plaintiff filed additional affidavits and defendant filed objections thereto and a Supplemental Memorandum.
Having considered the arguments presented during oral argument, having reviewed the pleadings, affidavits and memoranda on
file, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that there is no dispute that during the period preceding^

-l-
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the filing of plaintiff's Complaint:

(a) there was unusally high

precipitation in the Mantua Reservoir area where plaintiff's
land is located; (b) that defendant constructed earthen dams and
drainage ditches surrounding its reservoir; (c) that such measures
were part of defendant's efforts to control a water-flooding situation in the area; (d) that such measures resulted in water invading plaintiff's property; and (e) that the reservoir and drainage
ditches were constructed and had been in existence and use for
more than 20 years without complaints similar to plaintiff's.
The Court also concludes that the water which found its way onto
plaintiff's lands during 1984 resulted from defendant's flood
control measures necessitated by the abnormally heavy precipitation, and for which activities defendant is immune from suit by
virtue of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, particularly Section
63-30-3, as amended, and therefore defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment should be'granted as a matter ,of law.
/

WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that defendant Brigham City Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment be,
and hereby is, granted, and that plaintiff's Complaint be, and
hereby is, dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.

Judg-

ment is hereby entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff,
No Cause of Action, each party to bear its own costs.
DATED this jj/ day of January, 1986.

ALLAN L. LARSON
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER
SNOW# CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
DIANE BRANAMf
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
C i v i l No.
PROVO SCHOOL DISTRICT, a
body p o l i t i c ,

66,442

George E. B a l l i f , Judge

Defendant.
Defendant Provo School District's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for oral argument before the above-referenced Court
pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the District
Courts of the State of Utah, on August 16, 1985.

Plaintiff was

represented by Michael D. Esplin, of Aldrich, Nelson, Weight &
Esplin, and defendant was represented by Christopher C. Fuller
of the law firm of Snow, Chris tens en & Martineau.
The Court having made a Ruling on June 19, 1985 granting
defendant Provo School District's Motion for Summary Judgment,
having reviewed and considered the Memoranda and Affidavits on
file, having heard the argument of counsel, and having issued
another Ruling on August 29, 1985, which confirmed the June 19,
1985 Ruling of this Court, and being fully advised in the premises,

1-

The Court concludes that the 1984 Amendment to Section
63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act"),
provides absolute immunity to governmental entities from suit
for any injury or damage resulting from the management of flood
waters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and
storm systems, that said amendment is applicable to causes of
action arising even before the enactment of the amendment, and
that, as a result of these amended provisions of said section
of the Act, defendant Provo School District, as a political
subdivision and governmental entity of the State of Utah, is
immune from suit herein, and, as a matter of lav, defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted, No Cause of
Action.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
plaintiff's Complaint against defendant Provo School District
be, and the same hereby is, dismissed with prejudice and upon
the merits, and judgment is hereby entered in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff, No Cause of Action.
DATED this

y

day of September, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

George E,. gallif, Judge /
Fourth Judicial District Court
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
IN AND FOR THX

County of Davis, State of UtaK
KIMBALL BLACKBURN, et al.#
Plaintiff,
vs.
BOUNTIFUL CITY, et al.,
Defendant.

RULING ON MOTIONS
Civil No. 36265

The motions of all defendants came before the court for
hearing on March 5, 1985, with David 0. Seeley appearing for
the plaintiffs, Lynn Davies appearing for the defendant, Bountiful City, Brad Holm appearing for the defendant, South Davis
County Sewer Improvement District, and Robert H. Henderson appearing for the defendants, Davis County and West Bountiful
City. Mr. Henderson argued his motion to dismiss the third
party complaint. Mr. Holm and Mr. Davies argued their respective motions for summary judgment. After oral argument by all
parties the court took the matter under advisement. The court
now rules on the motions.
The plaintiffs were damaged in the spring of 1983 when raw
sewage backed up into their homes. The damage occurred because
of the spring floods. The 1984 amendment to section 60-30-3
provided that the management of flood waters was to be considered
a governmental function and that governmental entities were immune from suit.
This court believes the legislature intended to grant absolute immunity to governmental entities under the 1984 amendment. The plaintiffs1 damage clearly resulted from the spring
floods. Except for the flood waters in the sewer line there
would not have been a backup of sewer into the plaintiffs1 homes.
The provision in the first paragraph of section 63-30-3 providing
that "except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter" should

not be interpreted to put limitations on the second paragraph
having to do with flood damage. This court, however, recognizes
that there is a perfectly good argument to the contrary.
This court also believes that the 1984 amendment to section
63*30*3 should be applied retroactively. The considerations are
the same in this case as in the case of Frank vs. State, 613P.2d
517 (Utah 1980)
Accordingly, it is ordered that the motion to dismiss by
Davis County and by West Bountiful City are granted and the
third party complaint is dismissed, and the motions by Bountiful
City and South Davis County Sewer District for summary judgment
are granted.
Counsel for the South Davis County Sewer District is ordered
to draw a formal ruling in this case.
Dated March 14, 1985.
BY THE COURT:
^

•

" JUDGBs. /
Certificate of Mailing:
^-^
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to David 0. Seeley, American
Plaza II, Third Floor, 57 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101; Lynn Davies, CSB Tower, Suite 700, 50 South Main Street,
P. 0. Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110; Brad Holm, 261 East
300 South, Second Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and Robert
H. Henderson, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, Post Office Box
3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 on March 15, 1985.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RUSSELL MENDENHALL, et al,

Civil No. 62597

Plaintiffs,
VS.

R U L I N G

DREM CITY CORPORATION,
at al#
Defendants.

The motion of the defendant, Orem City, for Summary Judgment disnissing them from this proceeding came before the Court pursuant to
Rule 2.8.

The parties have submitted their supporting memorandum and

the Court having fully considered same, now enters the following:
RULING
The Court is inclined to grant the Motion of Orem City based upon
che passage by the 19C4 Budget Session of the Utah State Legislature of
bhe following amendment to Chapter 63-30-3 of the Governmental Immunity
Vet, the amending portion provides as follows:
"The management of flood waters and the construction,
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions
and governmental entities and their officers and employees

are immune from suit

for any injury or damage resulting

from those activities."
The retro-active application of this provision to the facts of
:he case before the Court come with the language of State v. Frank/
>13 P. 2d 517, having interpreted the amendment in an analogous case
:o be clarifying flooding as a governmental function for purposes of
jovernmental immunity.

It appears that other courts of similar juris-

Jiction to this and one department of this court has so ruled as to the
amendment.
The Court will not authorize the entry of an Order based upon
this Ruling to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity for further hearing/ oral argument or inquiry into any other pertinent matter plaintiffs deem appropriate and will allow a period of ten days for counsel
to request any further proceedings before such Ruling is implemented
^

by an Order.
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah/ this

II

day of September,

1984.

pv£
GEORGEC£. BALLTF, JUtfGE
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ise* CCT 30 iy. 9 5?
ROBERT H. HENDERSON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Orem City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RUSSELL MENDENHALL; SARAH
JAN BURY; BRENT STARK;
ROBERT CONOVER and VALERIE
CONOVER, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
v.
UNIVERSITY MALL, INC., a
corporation; OREM CITY
CORPORATION, a municipal
corporation; MERRILL
GAPPMAYER,

Civil No. 62,597

Defendants.
Defendant Orem City's Motion for Summary Judgment came
on for oral argument on October 26, 1984.

Plaintiffs were

represented by Thomas S. Taylor of the law firm Christensen,
Taylor & Moody.

Defendant Orem City was represented by

Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martineai
The Court having heard the argument of counsel, and
having reviewed and considered the memoranda on file, and
being fully advised in the premises:

The Court concludes that Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-3
as amended in 1984 provides absolute immunity to governmental
entities from suit for any injury or damage resulting from
management of flood waters and the construction, repair,
and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities; the Court concludes that the 1984 amendment to
the Utah Code Annotated S 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of
action arising even before the amendment; the Court concludes
that the acts Orem City has been sued upon were governmental
functions for which immunity has not been waived and that,
therefore, the governmental entity, Orem City, is immune from
suit herein pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated
S 63-30-3.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs and in
favor of the defendant Orem City dismissing with prejudice
plaintiffs1 Complaint against defendant Orem City.
DATED this

^^

day of October, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

Geofge E. milf /
District Court Judge
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DISTRICT COURT

ROEIRT H. HENDERSON
SNOW, CKR1STENSEN & MARTI NE.VJ
Attorneys for the Irrigation Companies
and Their Presidents and Killard County
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Bex 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (601) 521-90C0

OCT - 3 1984
%

MILLARD COUNTY
„

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EVAH CONK FAIRCHILD,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF UTAH; DEE C. HANSEN
as UTAH STATE ENGINEER; DELTA
CANAL COMPANY; PHIL SMITH,
President of Delta Canal
Company; MELVILLE IRRIGATION
COMPANY; QUINN SHEPHARD,
President of Melville
Irrigation Company; ABRAHAM
IRRIGATION COMPANY; RICHARD
HENRIE, President of Abraham
Irrigation Company; DESERET
IRRIGATION COMPANY; ROGER
STANWORTH, President of
Deseret Irrigation Company;
ROGER WALKER, as Lower Sevier
River Commissioner; MILLARD
COUNTY; DELTA CANAL COMPANY,
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY,
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY,
and DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY
dba DMAD COMPANY; DESERET
IRRIGATION COMPANY and
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY
dba GUNNISON BEND DAM; and
JOHN DOE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

ORDER, JUDGMENT AND
ORDER EXPRESSLY
DIRECTING ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT PURSUANT
TO RULE 54(b)

Civil No.:

7733

Defendants.
On September 21, 1984, the following Motions came on
regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock;

Clei

1.

Plair.tiif's Motion to Arena Corplamt; and

2.

Tne Motions tc Dismiss of the defendants.

The plaintiff \:as represented by Marcus G. Theodore.
T:JO Siate defendants were represented by Dallin W. Jensen
arc .Michael M. Quealy. The defendant Irrigation Companies and
their Presidents and defendant Millard County were represented
by Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martinea\
The Court having heard and considered the arguments of
counsel, and having reviewed the supporting affidavits and
memoranda on file, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises:
As to the Motions to Dismiss, the Court concludes that
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 as amended in 1984 provides absolute
immunity to governmental entities from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from management of flood waters and the
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems
by governmental entities; the Court concludes that the 1984
amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 is applicable to causes
of action arising even before the amendment; the Court concludes
that Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-10 provides immunity from suit for
discretionary acts relating to river operation, issuance of
permits, and inspection of dams and other facilities; the Court
concludes that the acts sued upon were governmental functions
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for which immunity has not been waived and therefore the
governmental entities are immune from suit herein pursuant
to the previsions ci Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 and § 63-30-10;
and the Court further concludes that the Complaint in its
present form fails to give reasonable notice to each defendant
and fails to plviad a factual basis for tne ccnclusory aiiegatic
of negligence.
As to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, the Court
concludes that the Motion is untimely and that the plaintiff
has failed to offer any explanation for the untimeliness of
the Motion; the Court further concludes that the Proposed
Amendment would be futile in that, inter alia, it proposes to
name as a defendant the insurer of the Irrigation Companies,
its proposes to name Intermountain Power Service Corporation, a
entity that, on the undisputed facts, had no ownership interest
whatsoever in the Irrigation Companies, used no water from the
Sevier River, and at no time participated in the activities of
which plaintiff complains, it proposes to name plaintiff's own
insurer, it would still fail to give reasonable notice to
each defendant and still fails to plead a factual basis for
the conclusory allegations of negligence, and in that it still
would not, and could not, state a civil rights claim under
42 U.S.C. S 1983 because, as a matter of law, the one time
flood that occurred does not constitute a "taking".
Now, therefore, IT IS ORDERED:

-3

1.

That the plaintiff's Kotion for Leave to Amend

be, and hereby is denied;
2.

That the Motions to Dismiss of the governmental

entity defendants, i.e., tne State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as
Utah State Engineer, Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier Commissioner,
and Millard County be, and hereby are granted?
3.

That the Motions to Dismiss of the Defendant

Presidents of the Irrigation Companies in their individual
capacities be, anJ nereby are granted, with leave to the
plaintiff to amend not later than 10 days from the date hereof
to allege with specificity acts of the Presidents taken in other
than their capacity as Presidents of the Irrigation Companies,
if any there be;
4.

That the Complaint be, and hereby is dismissed

with leave to the plaintiff to amend not later than 10 days
from the date hereof to set forth with specificity as to each
remaining defendant,

other than the governmental entity

defendants, the factual basis for the plaintiff's claims.
Based thereon, now therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that:
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiff,
dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's Complaint against
defendants State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as Utah State Engineer,
Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier River Commissioner, and Millard
County.
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The Court hereby expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay and hereby expressly directs that
this Judgment and the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to Amend be entered as a finai judgment within the
neaning of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Pules of Civil Procedure.
^—gay of

, 1984
BY JP«E>COUI^:

. Robert Bullock
.strict Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM
prior to the signature and
entry by the Court:

Date: 2 7

S&TlH&^

HT HENDERSON
Attorney for Irrigation Companies
their Presidents, and Millard
County
Date:
MARCUS G. THEODORE
Attorney for Plaintiff
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Utah Attorney Gener
Date
'

' MICHAEL ]
Assistant Attorne>/Ge/eral
Attorney for Utah State
Defendants

-D-

: J^V7 /rrf

ROBERT H. HENDERSONSNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Irrigation Companies, Their
Presidents and Millard County
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

L U L L A R B COUNT'
i
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLAYTON L. PALMER, and his wife
MARGARET D. PALMER,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

v.
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY;
JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANY;
STATE OF UTAH; DEE C. HANSEN as
Utah State Engineer;
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER SERVICE
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation;
DELTA CANAL COMPANY; PHIL SMITH,
President of Delta Canal Company;
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY;
QUINN SHEPHARD, President of
Melville Irrigation Company;
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY;
RICHARD HENRIE, President of
Abraham Irrigation Company;
DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY;
ROGER STANWORTH, President of
Deseret Irrigation Company,
ROGER WALKER as Lower Sevier
River Commissioner; MILLARD
COUNTY? DELTA CANAL COMPANY,
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY,
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY, and
DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY d/b/a
DMAD COMPANY; DESERET IRRIGATION
COMPANY and ABRAHAM IRRIGATION
COMPANY, d/b/a GUNNISON BEND DAM;
IRISH ANDERSON, TONY ANDERSON,
VINCENT CROPPER, GARY DUTSON,
LYLE STANWORTH, THOMAS ARLO S.
SKEEMS, the AXEL JENSEN ESTATE,
and JOHN DOE, Conk Water Users,
Defendants.

Civil No. 7732

. !>i

On August 15, 1984, the following Motions came on
regularly for hearing before the Honorable David Sam:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Change of Venue.

2.

Defendants Phil C. Nielson's and Central Utah Water

Company's Motion to Quash.
3.

The Motions to Dismiss of the governmental entity

defendants.
4.

The Motions to Dismiss of the defendant Irrigation

Companies and their presidents.
5.

Defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation's

Motion for Summary Judgment.
The plaintiffs were represented by Marcus G. Theodore.
The State defendants were represented by Dallin K. Jensen
and Michael M. Quealy.

The defendant Irrigation Companies and

their presidents and defendant Millard County were represented
by Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen &
Martineau.

Defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation

was represented by Joseph Novak, of counsel, Snow, Christensen
£ Martineau.
The Court having heard and considered the arguments of
counsel, and having reviewed the supporting affidavits and
memoranda on file, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises:
-2-

The Court concludes that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 as
amended in 1984 provides absolute immunity to governmental
entities from suit for any injury or damage resulting from
management of flood waters and the construction, repair, and
operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities;
the Court concludes that the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of action arising even
before the amendment; the Court concludes that Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-10 provides immunity from suit for discretionary acts
relating to river operation, issuance of permits, and inspection
of dams and other facilities; the Court concludes that the acts
sued upon were governmental functions for which immunity has
not been waived and therefore the governmental entities are
immune from suit herein pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-3 and S 63-30-10; the Court finds that on the
undisputed Affidavits on file there is no genuine issue of
fact and concludes that defendant Intermountain Power Service
Corporation is entitled to judgment of dismissal as a matter
of law; and the Court further concludes that the Amended
Complaint in its present form fails to give reasonable notice
to each defendant and fails to plead a factual basis for the
conclusory allegations of negligence.

Now therefore,

IT IS ORDERED:
1.

That the plaintiffs1 Motion for Change of Venue be,

and hereby is denied with leave to renew the Motion at the time
of impaneling the jury;
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2.

That the Motion to Quash of the defendants Phil

Nielson and the Central Utah Water Company be, and hereby is
granted;
3.

That the Motions to Dismiss of the governmental

entity defendants, i.e., the State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as
Utah State Engineer, Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier Commissioner,
and Millard County be, and hereby are converted into Motions for
Summary Judgment, and that said Motions for Summary Judgment be,
and hereby are granted;
4.

That the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant

Intermountain Power Service Corporation be, and hereby is granted;
5.

That the Motions to Dismiss of the defendant Presidents

of the Irrigation Companies in their individual capacities be,
and hereby are granted, with leave to the plaintiffs to amend
not later than 10 days from the date hereof to allege with
specificity acts of the Presidents taken in other than their
capacity as Presidents of the Irrigation Companies, if any there
be;
6.

That the Amended Complaint be, and hereby is dismissed

with leave to the plaintiffs to amend not later than 10 days from
the date hereof to set forth with specificity as to each
remaining defendant, other than the governmental entity defendants
and defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation, the factual
basis for the plaintiffs1 claims.
Based thereon, now therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that:
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs,
dismissing vrith prejudice plaintiffs' Amended Complaint against

defendants State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as Utah State Engineer,
Rocer Walker, as lower Sevier River Conunissicner, and Millard
County; and that
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs,
dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' Amended Complaint against
defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation•
DATED this

fr+J

day of August, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID SAM
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM
prior to the signature and
entry_fc>y the Court:
Date :

26 Ay,<1 I72<1

BERT'H. HENDERSON
Attorney for Irrigation Companies,
r president^ and Millard County

0~SEP!TH%VAK

*L

Date;

/4es&</sr 20,

/9Jf

ttorney for Intermountain Power
Service Corporation
Date:
MARCUS G. THEODORE
Attorney for Plaintiff
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Utah Attorney General

By.

Date ;
MICHAEL M. _
Assistant Attorney ^Tneral
Attorney for Utah State Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FRANCIS B. CHESLEY, et al,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 7^86

vs.

RULING

DELTA CITY,
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court under Rule 2.8 on
Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The Court

has received the affidavits on file and the respective
memorandum of counsel and upon being advised in the premises,
now makes the following
RULING
1.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

The Court is of the opinion that plaintiffs' claim is
barred by Section 63-30-3 UCA, 1953 as amended.

The court

is further of the opinion that Senate Bill 97 adopted by the
198M Utah Legislature is an affirmation of the prior
legislative intent as regards flood waters.

The Court

believes that Frank vs. State, 613 P2d 517 is supportive
of this ruling.
2.

The trial date of July 18, 1984, and the alternative

(Ruling)

(2)

trial date of November 28, 1984, are hereby vacated,
--00O00--

Dated this / / - d a y of June, 1984.

BY THE COURT

CULLEN$7cHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

cc:

Eldon-A. Eliason
Attorney at Law
Robert H. Henderson
Attorney at Law

A, f \.>>>H, .:• . i..-.•<K O f

DlbTAlC T COUR:

JUL 11 1984

ROBERT H. HENDERSON
SNOW, CHR1STESSEN & MARTIKEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

MILLARD COUN

M

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FRANCIS B. CKESLEY and
NONA B. CHESLEY,

j
a

Plaintiffs,
v.

::
:
:

DELTA CITY, a Municipal
corporation of the State
of Utah,

:
i
i

Defendant.

The Defendant's

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 7486

;

Motion for Summary Judgment came on

regularly before the Court pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the
Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the State of Utah.
The Court having reviewed the affidavits on file, the memoranda
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and the
Court being of the opinion that Senate Bill 97 adopted by the
1984 Utah Legislature is an affirmation of the prior legislativ
intent with regard to flood waters, and that the plaintiffs'
claim is barred by Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-3 as amended, now,
therefore, it is ORDERED:

That defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and
hereby is, granted.
DATED this

day of W

1984.
BY THE COURT:

^Cullen Y./Christensen
District/Court Judge
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r iDiNr.ira'.L'V .**
MAY 1 6 i:-E',

ROBERT H. HENDERSON
SNO.%, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Sandy City
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (8C1) 521-9000

/
DeK.', Cerr,

IN' THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALLAN L. BRAKENSIEK and
ORDER

MARILYN BRAKENSIEK,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, SALT
LAKE COUNTY and SANDY CITY,

Civil No. C84-0564
Judge Scott Dar.iels

Defendants.
The Motions to Dismiss of the defendants Dixie Six
Corporation, Salt Lake County, and Sandy City came before the
Court on the regular law and motion calendar on May 11, 1984,
the Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, at 2:00 p.m.

The

plaintiffs were represented by David Scofield of the law firm
of Parsons and Crowther.
by Craig G. Adamson.
A. Livingston.

Dixie Six Corporation was represented

Salt Lake County was represented by Roger

Sandy City was represented by Robert H. Henderson

of the law firm Snow, Christensen i Martineau.

The Court having

heard the argument of counsel, and having reviewed the memoranda
on file, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and

the Court being of the opinion that Utah Code Annotated § 63-3^
as amended in 1984 provides absolute immunity to governmental
entities from suit for any injury or danage result from management
of flood waters and the construction, repair, and operation cf
flood and storm systems by governmental entities, and the Court
being of the further opinion that the 1984 amendment to Utah
Code Annotated § 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of action arising
even before the amendment, now, therefore, it is ORDERED:
1.

That the Motion to Dismiss of the defendant Salt Lake

County be, and hereby is, granted;
2.

That the Motion to Dismiss of the defendant Sandy City

be, and hereby is, granted;
3.

That the Motion to Dismiss of Dixie Six Corporation

be, and hereby is, denied.
{Y

DATED this

day of May, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
/

A * '•*• i

)

C m k f

Ty, r i

N?-A )&<JU (/'»•'

^

" Scott Daniels
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
/ '

Rbrforj^Liva^hgston
Attorney for Salt Lake County

3r
CUfW,
David Scofield
Attorney for Plaintiffs

-2-

,n

'

''

/

' '

Craig Adamson
Attorney for Defendant Dixie
Six Corporation

APPENDIX V

STANLEY L. BALLIF
Attorney at Law
Bank of Utah Building
2605 Washington BouLevard
Suite 310
Ogden, UT 84403
Telephone: (801) 394-5579

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAROL GREENWOOD,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
PLEASANT VIEW CITY, a
Municipal Corporation,

Civil No. 93915
Judge David Roth

Defendant.

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was heard by the above entitled
Court on April 27, 1987.

Plaintiff was represented by Stanley L. Ballif

and Defendant was represented by Christopher C. Fuller.

The Defendant had

submitted a Memorandum of Authorities in support of their Motion and had
also filed Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition.

The

Court heard arguments from both parties and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss is denied in that the statutes relied on by Defendant's only
provide immunity to the governmental entity in managing, constructing, repairing, operating a storm system, while managing flood waters.

DATED this 3 ^ 4

V^\1
%

?

day

of

AJOadt-,

, 1987.

BY THE COURT

CCj*
Approved as to form

3>/ Q

^ (^Jth

APPENDIX VI

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, "IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY

CAROL GREENWOOD,
Plaintiff,
JUDGE »S RULING
Case No. 93915

vs.
PLEASANT VIEW CITY,
A Municipal Corporation,
Defendant

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above enti tied matter came
on for hearing before the Hon. DAVID E. ROTH, Judge of the
above entitled Court, on April 27, 1987.
WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had, to wit*

A

P

pearances:
STANLEY L. BALLIF, ESQ.,
Attorney for the Plaintiff;
CHRISTOPHER C. FULLER, ESQ.,
Attorney for the Defendant.

1

THE COURT:

Prior to this hearing, I hadn't seen

any photographs, and wasn't as clear in the facts as I am
now,

assuming I am now, and I was hoping that what I would

see would be something in the nature of a manhole cover on
the street or on a sidewalk.

And I think that would take

it out of the immunity area and put it in the area of
maintaining streets or sidewalks in a safe condition.
The other thing that troubles me about this is that I
understand the reason for the statute.
need for the immunity.

I understand the

I understand the need for governmental

agencies to be able to manage flood waters and be immune
from their actions.

And this isn't the typical kind of

case I think the Legislature had in mind when they enacted
this statute.
I am concerned about the broadness of it, and I am
going to limit it at this point and deny the Motion to Dismis
the case.

This decision, I think will be ripe for appeal;

probably should be appealed, because I am not aware of any
law in this area, and I guess I am making law by making the
decision.
Where the statute says the management of flood water
and other natural disasters, and operations and construction
of storm systems by governmental entities are considered to
be governmental functions and so forth, the government and
their employees will be immune, I am interpreting to mean

2

the government is managing, constructing, repairing, operating
a storm system, while managing flood waters they are immune.
But it does not mean that once having managed, constructed,
repaired or operated, they may walk avzay from whatever they
have done and not maintain it in a safe condition.
are not immune.

They

And the word maintenance is left out.

think it should be in there.

I

And I don't think that the

immunity should be as broad as you can logically argue it
is in this case.
There you go.

Mr. Ballif, you prepare the ruling?

MR. BALLIF:

Yes, I will.

MR. FULLER:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Good luck.

3

C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH
County of Weber

)
) ss.
)

I, James N. Jones, do hereby certify that I am one of
the Official Court Reporters for the State of Utah, and
a competent machine shorthand writer;
That on April 27, 1987, I reported in machine shorthand
the proceedings had in the matter of Carol Greenwood vs.
Pleasant View City, Case No. 93915.
That thereafter, I reduced a portion of my machine
shorthand notes to typewriting, and the foregoing transcript
pages 2 and 3, constitute a full, true and correct transcrip-j:
of the ruling by Judge Roth.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
28th day of July, 1987.

tfames N. J"o#es
Totxe
'Official Court Reporter
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APPENDIX VII

CHAPTER 92

CHAPTER 93

H. B, iNo. 171
Passed February 27, 1985
Effective April 29, 1985

H. B. No. 177
Passed February 25, 1985
Effective April 29, 1985

JUROR COMPETENCY IN CASES
INVOLVING ORDINANCES

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR
NATURAL DISASTERS

By Don R. Strong

By Kaye Browning

AN ACT RELATING TO JUDICIAL PROCEDURE;
PROVIDING
COMPETENCY
REQUIREMENTS FOR JURORS SERVING ON
CASES INVOLVING THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:

AN ACT RELATING TO GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY; INCLUDING MANAGEMENT OF
NATURAL DISASTERS AS AN ACTIVITY
FOR WHICH GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
ARE IMMUNE.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:

AMENDS:
78-46-7. AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 130,
LAWS OF UTAH 1979

AMENDS:
63-30-3, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
33. LAWS OF UTAH 1984

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 78-46-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
enacted by Chapter 130, Laws of Utah 1979, is
amended to read:

Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 33, Laws of Utah 1984, is
amended to read:

78-46-7. Persons competent to serve as jurors.
(1) A person is competent to serve as a juror
[provided] if the person is:
KH] M a citizen of the United States;
({*)] (b] over the age of 18 years;
[£*)] (£l a resident of the county: and
[f4)] (d) able to read, speak, and understand
the English language.
(2) In municipalities which are not primary or
secondary locations for the circuit court, a person is
not competent to serve as a furor m cases involving
the violation ot a municipal ordinance unless the
person, m addition to meeting the requirements
listed in Subsection (1), resides wuhm the municipality whose ordinance is alleged to have been violated or. in the case of a municipality with a population of fewer than 3,000 persons, resides wuhm 15
miles of the municipality.

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from
suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned
hospital, nursing home, or other governmental
health care facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical
training program conducted in either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers
and employees are immune from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from those activities.

Approved March 16, 1985
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Approved March 16. 1985

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Appellant's
Brief by mailing four copies to J« Paul Stockdale, Attorney at
Law, 2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 340, Ogden, Utah, 84401, who,
by Entry of Appearance dated December 24, 1987, is attorney of
record for plaintiff-respondent, this

day of February, 1988,

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

r
Christopher ^.JPuller
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

